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Abstract
The new cabinet ushered in after 
the 2009 national elections features 
new and renamed ministries. Those 
expected to take the lead in a new 
initiative to resuscitate the rural 
economy are the Ministry of Rural 
Development and Land Reform 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. While the 
newfound priority placed on 
rural development is welcome, its 
separation from the dynamic sub- 
sectors in the rural economy is not. 
This brief shows how existing policies 
are bifurcated between BEE models 
for the better off and welfare for 
the poor. There is now a danger that 
the two ministries will replicate the 
dualism of the so-called ‘first’ and 
‘second’ economies – an approach 
that deepens exclusion from and 
legitimises exploitation in the 
economic core, and prevents the 
creation of a ‘missing middle’ of 
successful small producers. What is 
needed instead is rural development 
that restructures the commercial 
sectors of agriculture, forestry 
and fisheries, and the exploitative 
class relations (with workers and 
small producers) on which they are 
based, and which breaks down the 
concentration of capital and market 
power in few hands. Only then can 
redistributing land, forests and 
fishing quotas create new pathways 
for ‘the rural poor’ to participate, and 
produce, in these sectors in ways that 
create livelihoods and jobs, and set 
South Africa on a different and more 
appropriate growth path. 
1. Introduction
When President Jacob Zuma 
announced his new cabinet on 10 May 
2009, he ushered in a new era for 
the state’s apparatus charged with 
responding to rural poverty: political 
and bureaucratic responsibilities for 
land reform, fisheries, forestry and 
agricultural development have been 
reshuffled, and are now clustered 
into an array of new and renamed 
ministries and departments.
Zuma presented this reshuffling as 
a sign that his administration will 
embark on a re-energised initiative 
for rural development, in line with 
the ANC’s manifesto for the 2009 
national elections which featured 
‘rural development, food security 
and land reform’ as one of its top five 
priorities.
This signals a new commitment from 
a party that has historically relied on 
an urban support base of the working 
class and unemployed and has 
de-emphasised, if not quite ignored, 
the spatial legacy of apartheid and 
the concentration of poverty in the 
rural areas. 
2. Mix-and-match 
ministries
For the future of the rural areas, the 
most significant changes in the new 
cabinet are the separation of land 
and agriculture, and the introduction 
of rural development as a ministerial 
mandate. 
Responsibilities for land reform and 
for agriculture have always been 
held by separate departments. But 
1
July 2009PolicyBrief
for the past 13 years these have been 
joined in one ministry – of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs – headed by Derek 
Hanekom from 1996 to 1999, by Thoko 
Didiza from 1999 to 2006, and by Lulu 
Xingwana from 2006 until the 2009 
national elections.
Now, the new-look cabinet places 
these responsibilities in separate 
ministries: a Ministry of Rural 
Development and Land Reform 
(MRDLR) on the one hand, and a 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF) on the other. Both 
are to be headed by former MECs for 
Agriculture: Gugile Nkwinti from the 
Eastern Cape, and the Northern Cape’s 
Tina Joemat-Pettersson, respectively.
But key decisions about government’s 
plans for the rural areas are likely to be 
taken elsewhere. At the heart of the 
new administration’s thinking on the 
future of the economy is a heavyweight 
triumvirate made up of the National 
Treasury headed by Pravin Gordhan, 
a Ministry of Economic Development 
under former unionist Ebrahim Patel, 
and a National Planning Commission in 
the Presidency led by Trevor Manuel. It 
is widely expected that they will tussle 
not only over state purse strings, but 
also the central questions of where 
in the economy to invest, whether 
the rural areas can become a source 
of jobs and growth, and therefore 
whether or not to retain existing 
approaches to industrial policy and 
spatial development.
A number of other changes to 
the ministries will affect the rural 
areas. Water Affairs and Forestry 
becomes Water and Environment. 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
becomes simply Tourism. Provincial 
and Local Government becomes 
Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs. And a new 
Ministry for Women, Youth, Children 
and People with Disability – what one 
might term ‘the ministry for nearly 
everyone’ – has been established 
to deal with these groups who 
predominate among the poor in 
both urban and rural areas. How all 
of these institutions and mandates 
can be harnessed to respond to 
rural poverty, unemployment and 
underdevelopment remains very 
unclear – but it is likely that the 
Ministry for Rural Development and 
Land Reform will need to take the 
lead in providing some overarching 
coherence.
Are all of these new institutional 
arrangements an apt response to the 
seemingly intractable problems of 
rural underdevelopment and economic 
exclusion? 
3. Separating Land 
Reform from 
Agriculture
Separating responsibility for 
agriculture and land reform into 
separate ministries is a surprising 
move, apparently at odds with the 
ANC’s manifesto promise to ‘ensure a 
much stronger link between land and 
agrarian reform programmes’ (ANC, 
2009:9). 
There is disagreement on whether it is 
a good thing or not. 
The separation of the two has been 
welcomed by some in the agricultural 
establishment who, pointing to dips 
in output on redistributed farms, see 
land reform as a threat to commercial 
farming, which they wish to see 
insulated from the reform process. 
In this view, there are two types 
of agriculture – commercial and 
subsistence – and the agriculture 
department should be freed up to 
focus on commercial farming, rather 
than the new and poorer farmers on 
redistributed land and in the former 
Bantustans, whose type and scale of 
farming, and therefore whose needs, 
might differ substantially. In this view, 
the main virtue of this new cabinet 
arrangement is that it ensures that 
land reform happens at the margins of 
mainstream commercial agriculture.
On the other hand, the new cabinet 
has drawn a more critical response 
from rural people’s organisations and 
lobby groups. Their main objection 
is that the core problem facing land 
reform has not only been its slow 
pace – just five per cent of commercial 
farmland has been redistributed in 
the past 15 years – but the extremely 
poor level of support for new, small 
and cash-strapped farmers who have 
been settled on this land. Agriculture, 
they insist, should be integrated 
with land reform and should be at 
the heart of rural development. 
Separating agriculture from both rural 
development and land reform, then, is 
to move in the wrong direction.
Yet if one considers the track record of 
the past decade or so, responsibilities 
for agriculture and land reform have 
never been effectively integrated, 
despite being in the same ministry since 
1996. None of the three ministers of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs were able 
to solve this problem while they were 
responsible for both departments. 
And land reform has been crippled as 
a result. 
The blame for the dismal track record 
of production on redistributed farms 
must fall largely on the national and 
provincial departments of agriculture, 
which have simply failed to come to 
the party. Despite the introduction of 
some agricultural support and funds 
for land reform beneficiaries in recent 
years, the agriculture departments 
have remained biased in favour of 
commercial farming and unsupportive 
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of smallholder farming and the 
production systems of the poor. Less 
than 1 in 20 land reform beneficiaries 
have benefited at all from either 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme (CASP) grants or Micro 
Agricultural Finance Institutions of 
South Africa (MAFISA) loans. And land 
alone does not produce livelihoods or 
development. 
The notion of a need for ‘integration’ 
of land reform with agriculture, 
though, fails to capture the scale of the 
challenge. It elides the fundamentally 
political tension between promoting 
business-as-usual growth in the 
productive sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries) 
and restructuring them through a 
thoroughgoing redistribution of assets 
and wealth. 
4. Dualism and the 
‘missing middle’
Land and agriculture have been caught 
up in the contradictions of government 
programmes that address the problem 
of ‘dualism’ by dealing with each of the 
so-called ‘two economies’ separately. 
They have fallen victim to this way of 
thinking, and have perpetuated it.
As a result, state policy has become 
bifurcated in recent years. On the one 
hand, transformation of commercial 
agriculture is now largely pursued 
through joint ventures, strategic 
partnerships and black economic 
empowerment (BEE) deals that 
deracialise ownership but leave 
patterns of production and 
employment  – and ultimately the 
impact on the economy – largely 
unchanged. This has been most 
evident where land claims on high-
value farmland have been settled, 
increasingly with the proviso that 
the claimants neither live on nor 
farm their land, but enter into 
partnerships (often with the previous 
owners) through long-term leases or 
joint ventures to ensure continuity 
of production. But this also involves 
continuity in other areas: while having 
a stake in commercial farms, claimants 
remain in overcrowded conditions in 
communal areas, reliant on uncertain 
future dividend payments, and usually 
no new jobs are created. 
At the other end of the spectrum, 
the demand for land and farming 
opportunities by the poor, 
compounded by the sharp increase in 
food prices over the past 18 months, 
has spawned initiatives to support 
food production by the poor, often in 
the form of ‘starter packs’ of seed and 
implements. This response, driven by 
provincial departments of agriculture, 
can be characterised as food security 
through self-provisioning on a micro 
scale – an approach reiterated in the 
ANC’s manifesto in which it commits 
to expand food production among the 
poor, including community schemes 
to produce food ‘in schools, health 
facilities, churches and urban and 
traditional authority areas’ (ANC, 
2009:11).
Addressing direct consumption needs 
is an important and overdue response 
to poverty and hunger but, while 
it is likely to have popular appeal, it 
is ultimately limited. First, without 
redistributing land and water for 
agriculture, ‘own production’ by the 
poor via starter packs, particularly 
in urban areas, is unlikely to be at 
the scale required to be a workable 
solution to food insecurity. Second, 
the poor are to produce – but at the 
margins rather than in the commercial 
farming heartland. In no way will this 
change who profits from producing 
and selling food, or pose a challenge 
to the large players who dominate 
the market: the big farmers, the 
agribusinesses and supermarkets, as 
well as the oligopolistic agro-food 
processors and manufacturers that 
have been able to fix prices and raise 
food costs. 
It is, of course, important both to deal 
with the worst excesses of rural hunger 
and to deracialise commercial farming 
(and farmers). But so far, redistributive 
measures seem peripheral to the 
overriding trends towards capital-
intensive farming, job shedding, 
and consolidation of both land and 
agricultural capital in fewer hands – 
trends that are antithetical to rural 
development. And neither approach 
tackles the really contentious work of 
restructuring the ‘core economy’ in 
recognition that its dynamics generate 
poverty and exclusion.
Between these poles of food security 
gardens and big commercial farms 
is a missing middle: the untapped 
potential for smallholder farmers 
who want to produce for their own 
consumption and for a market. 
Existing approaches have failed to 
create opportunities for such people. 
And the most likely candidates – 
the approximately 4 million ‘semi-
subsistence’ and 200 000 small- and 
medium-scale producers – are in 
the communal areas of the former 
Bantustans, which have attracted the 
least agricultural (and infrastructural) 
support and investment. A serious 
approach to food security would 
enable them to produce and market 
on non-exploitative terms, to bypass 
(or transform) the mass retail markets 
in which just four large supermarkets 
dominate, and to benefit from rising 
food prices. 
This bifurcation emerges from 
assumptions in conceptions of 
‘development’ that underpin many 
past government policies, and a bias 
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the ability to process and sell their 
own harvests, are unaffected by the 
provision of rights to the poor.
In the forestry sector, the centrepiece 
of transformation has been the 
creation of a BEE sector charter, still 
in the early stages of implementation, 
which aims to force the small handful 
of dominant market players to bring 
black partners on board. So far this has 
brought little benefit either to workers 
or people living on or near private 
and state forests. ‘Empowerment’ in 
the sector has mostly taken the form 
either of narrow BEE shareholding or 
externalising risk through converting 
employment on timber estates 
into (often insecure) contracting 
arrangements. The unbundling 
of state forests has promoted the 
growth of large companies with BEE 
shareholding, while provisions to 
transfer smaller state plantations in 
communal areas to rural communities 
to be cultivated as ‘woodlots’ are yet to 
be implemented. The one area where 
production by the poor is on the rise 
is through outgrower schemes where 
they produce for and sell to the large 
companies like Sappi and Mondi.
With regards to water, reforms to 
separate the ownership of land from 
the ownership of water rights is 
yet to be fully thought through or 
implemented, and so large farmers 
and agro-industries (as well as mines) 
continue to dominate the use of scarce 
water resources in rural areas. Once 
trading in water rights gets underway, 
as provided for in the Water Act, it is 
expected that commercial interests 
– both agricultural and mining – 
will buy up these rights from poor 
communities. Meanwhile, important 
initiatives to rehabilitate irrigation in 
the former Bantustans – such as the 
Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes (RESIS) in Limpopo – have 
focused on ‘commercialisation’, often 
as part of ambitious (and risky) joint 
ventures for the production of cash 
crops like cotton and tobacco which 
have tended to land marginal farmers 
in stifling debt. Small to medium 
producers aiming to produce at a 
level beyond household subsistence 
have been stymied by a ceiling on 
allocations for subsistence (so-called 
‘Schedule One’) water use.
Put simply, many of these policies 
have aimed to deracialise the ‘first 
economy’ without transforming it, 
and so entrench the class relations 
that produce exploitation and 
marginality – which gets called the 
‘second economy’. Little attention 
has been given to dismantling the 
divides between the two and so those 
eking out survival on the margins are 
prevented from filling the ‘missing 
middle’. The stark contrast between 
wealth and poverty that former 
president Thabo Mbeki once described 
as two economies has in many respects 
been made even starker by the very 
policies his government pursued. Will 
Zuma’s government continue on this 
path?
Back to his new cabinet, then: the 
imminent danger is that MAFF will 
focus on these productive sectors 
with a view to stimulating ‘business-
as-usual’ growth, both to respond to 
local demand and to develop export 
markets, while MRDLR is saddled with 
addressing rural poverty, without 
reshaping these key sectors in which 
the poor participate, often in marginal 
ways – in other words, that the two 
ministries replicate the dualism of the 
so-called ‘first’ and ‘second’ economies. 
MAFF will deal with ‘wealth’ and 
‘growth’ for commercial farming, 
forestry and fisheries while MRDLR will 
deal with the former Bantustans. This 
division of labour must be avoided.
which equates commercialisation 
(and industrialised production at 
scale) with development – even when 
this aggravates patterns of economic 
exclusion. The dualistic thinking that 
results is evident also in other sectors 
of the economy on which rural people 
depend. Look at fisheries, forestry and 
water, for instance.
In fisheries, the allocation of quotas 
has favoured larger companies. 
Transformation policies have focused 
on increasing BEE shareholding within 
these, which has been done with 
some success, as well as allocations of 
smaller quotas to black entrepreneurs 
who, because these were insufficient, 
tended to sell these ‘paper quotas’ on 
to the larger companies. Litigation in 
2007 against unfair quotas successfully 
prompted a new focus on small-scale 
or ‘artisanal’ fishers in poor coastal 
communities, whose allocations 
have since been increased. Yet both 
the quota system and the inability 
to secure larger fishing vessels 
and equipment due to financial 
constraints, and also to some extent 
business skills, prevent these small 
fishers from expanding their scale of 
extraction, and limit them to fishing at 
a lower level and delivering what they 
catch to the established companies for 
processing. So while reallocation of 
quotas has made some contribution 
to alleviating poverty, it has only 
aimed to enable the most marginal 
to subsist and, as in agriculture, the 
real money is made in downstream 
activities like processing and 
marketing, where ownership remains 
highly concentrated. The structure of 
the sector is intact: the (deracialising) 
top-end of fishing companies and 
processors still dominate the market 
and, as long as fishing communities 
are prevented from scaling up to 
become independent operators with 
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5. Rethinking rural 
development
What is needed now is fresh thinking 
about the future of rural South Africa 
and a vision which confronts the still-
stark divides within the commercial 
farming heartland of former ‘white 
RSA’, as well as between it and the 
‘Bantustans’ – and aims to transform 
both of them. The core challenge 
is to enable large numbers of the 
rural poor to participate in economic 
activities – to produce, process and 
market – on beneficial terms in order 
to enable employment (including 
self-employment) for the rural 
poor, not only welfare. This would 
reduce rural poverty and create new 
livelihoods and jobs, but also set 
South Africa on a different and more 
appropriate growth path.
Taking charge of such an ambitious 
and all-encompassing plan for the rural 
areas must be a new ‘Rural Cluster’ that 
includes the two ministries but also the 
economic powerhouse of government: 
Treasury, Economic Development, and 
the National Planning Commission. 
Unless this happens, MRDLR will be 
relegated to junior status within the 
cabinet and within government’s 
agenda; it will be expected to achieve 
the impossible and will be little more 
than a latter day Department of 
Native Affairs, brought back from the 
apartheid past. 
The central position that rural develop- 
ment now occupies in the thinking 
of government draws attention to 
the multidimensional nature of rural 
people’s livelihoods – a recognition 
that land reform cannot be entirely 
about agriculture, that people want 
and need land for a variety of purposes, 
and that rural people participate in a 
variety of economic activities for their 
survival. But the new ministry charged 
with rural development (as well as 
land reform) will have to deal with 
logistical and institutional problems in 
defining its remit – and it will have to 
confront the potential for duplication 
with the tasks of other line ministries 
as it focuses on rural (and agricultural) 
land reform, rural job creation, rural 
infrastructure, rural housing, rural 
transport, rural education, rural health, 
and so on. There is no coherent policy 
to frame rural development, and 
there will inevitably be confusion as 
this new ministry attempts to delimit 
a coherent boundary to its work and 
establish sensible and cooperative 
relations with other line departments.
Top priority therefore is for a collabo-
rative initiative to develop overarch-
ing rural development policy, which 
was lacking under the previous admin- 
istration, and to place the dynamic 
sub-sectors of real wealth in the rural 
economy at its centre. 
6. What are the policy 
alternatives? 
Core to rural development will be the 
redistribution of both land and water 
for agriculture, to make possible 
the expansion of incomes from 
employment and self-employment, in 
particular, and promoting low-input, 
small-scale primary production of 
food for consumption and sale. The 
greatest potential for small farmers of 
fresh produce is in the high-potential 
regions of KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, 
Mpumalanga and the Western Cape, 
in particular. 
Practical interventions are needed to 
support smaller farmers as well as the 
emergence of a ‘missing middle’ of 
producers able to market their surplus 
in local – or even national – markets. 
The ‘Rural Cluster’ must promote and 
invest in:
•	 Redistribution of land and water 
rights in areas of high demand and 
regions close to urban markets;
•	 Irrigation for small-scale 
horticulture, including through 
the creation of infrastructure for 
rainwater harvesting; 
•	 Agricultural cooperatives for input 
supply, processing and marketing;
•	 Fencing for smallholder farmers 
in communal areas, as well as in 
transport and sorting, packing and 
storage infrastructure;
•	 Fresh produce markets in towns 
and villages as outlets for producers 
of small surpluses of fruit and 
vegetables; 
•	 Affordable, subsidised interest rates 
for credit from, and competent 
management in, the Land Bank.
These will require support for 
subdivision of larger properties to 
make possible smallholder units, 
revamping of agricultural extension 
services, the resuscitation of targeted 
subsidies for inputs and implements, 
public support for smallholders 
to extend into value-adding, 
particularly in sectors that provide 
highly seasonal patterns of income 
and labour demand, and perhaps 
most importantly, a combination of 
regulation and incentives to counter 
the monopolistic character of food 
processing and marketing.
Interventions such as these have the 
potential to support food production 
by the poor (facilitating household 
food security) and at the same time 
promote rural entrepreneurs who can 
engage in ‘accumulation from below’. 
Poverty reduction and kick-starting 
a new rural growth path must be 
compatible, not ‘either-or’ options.
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7. Conclusion
The dynamics (and class relations) that 
produce wealth for some produce 
poverty and exclusion for others. But 
this does not mean that we should 
have policies for the rich and policies 
for the poor, ministries for the rich 
and ministries for the poor. High-
level coordination will be needed to 
ensure that the new ministries build 
an equitable regime of people’s 
rights to natural resources, which is 
a precondition for emergence and 
survival (let alone success) of small- 
and medium-scale farmers who can 
and want to produce for themselves 
and for a market.
South Africa has been described as 
having ‘two economies’, but it is more 
accurate to characterise it as having 
one integrated economy that is un- 
equal, fragmented and segmented. 
The implications are now starting 
to be seriously explored. Breaking 
this cycle of economic exclusion is 
the focus of the Presidency’s Second 
Economy Strategy produced in early 
2009, which emphasises the need for 
employment creation ‘from below’ 
in the rural areas, including through 
micro-enterprise and self-employment 
in smallholder agriculture and 
cooperatives. 
The new political priority placed 
on rural development is a great 
opportunity and new approaches are 
urgently needed. Rural development 
must not be limited to ad hoc and 
localised ‘projects’. A new policy 
framework must set out an ambitious 
agenda for structural change in the 
key rural economic sectors. It must 
change the ways in which the poor 
participate in, own, control, use, and 
produce in the rural economy, and 
find new pathways of production and 
accumulation.
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